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"Dicta Observes
A NEW METHOD OF TEACHING LAW
A number of peculiar things have taken place in Germany since Mr. Hitler took charge of the nation, one of
which has been the installation of a community camp for
young lawyers. The idea seems to be that these young men
must retain their characters as human beings, and not permit
their legal studies to convert them into "mental" entities.
Seventy young men who were about to take their final examinations for the bar were collected and shipped off to a community camp for a three-week period, where all distinctions,
social, intellectual and otherwise, are supposedly dissipated
by a budding communal spirit. They were obliged to follow
a prescribed routine day after day. They arrived the same
day and lost in a few moments everything that distinguished
one from the other in a material way. Clothes were taken
from them and they were required to wear gray linen suits
and diminutive caps, and to live in a large building which
served as a dormitory.
Their rising hour is 6 A. M. followed by a strenuous
half hour of setting-up exercises and road work before breakfast. Later come the lessons in craftsmanship, nature study
and gymnastics, and their day is so completely filled that few
have time to think about the stiff oral examinations before
they can become full-fledged lawyers.
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THE KIDNAPING MENACE
Recent newspaper articles indicate that Denver is again
to be the scene of a recurrence of kidnaping activities.
The New York Law Journal, in commenting on the
payment of ransom, raised the question as to whether or not
such payments constitute compounding of felony, and that
crime is further encouraged thereby because the results are
highly profitable and partially legalized.
However, whatever the legal phase may be, the human
element and interest in the fate of the victim probably will
continue to outweigh any fear of legal responsibility for any
action taken to secure the return of the victim.

"EMERGENCY" LEGISLATION
By PAUL W. LEE, of the Denver Bar

A

MATTER of common discussion among laymen and

of particular interest to lawyers is the question of
how far the state and national legislatures may go in
enacting laws predicated on the emergency created by the current depression.
Can a law, which in normal times could be clearly seen
to trench upon constitutional guarantees and to violate prohibitions, be nevertheless supported because of an emergency
declared to exist?
If "emergency" legislation is to be upheld as such, what
are the limits, if any, on the power of the legislature?
There are a number of recent cases decided by state
courts which expound the doctrine.
A recent decision of the Supreme Court of Minnesota
upholds a Mortgage Moratorium Act, although it is admitted
that the operation of the Act impaired the obligation of a
contract.
There the court definitely held that, under the police
power in a public emergency, statutes may be enacted which
"temporarily" impair the obligations of contracts, provided
they be such as the emergency reasonably demands.
It is a judicial question whether the exercise of the extraordinary power is "reasonable."
Thus, the general police power becomes supreme in a
state where such emergency is found to exist, and specific
guarantees concerning the obligations of contract must yield.1
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of North Dakota has recently ruled that a statute is not sustainable as an
emergency exercise of the police power where its effect is to
contravene constitutional provisions.
It was here held that a law fixing a period of redemption
from foreclosure sale, which existed at the time of the execution of a mortgage, constituted as much a part of the contract
as if it had been expressly incorporated therein, and the 1933
statute, in extending the period of redemption and thereby
preventing the issuance of a deed upon foreclosure at the expiration of the redemption period provided by law in existence
at the time of the execution of the mortgage, was also void
'Blaisdell v. Home B. & L. Assn., U. S. Law Jour., Vol. 1., p. 421.
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in that it deprives the person entitled to such deed of the possession of his property and its rents and profits without due
process of law, in violation of the State Constitution and the
14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution.2
The South Carolina Court has upheld the Emergency
Banking Act of 1933 giving the governor of the state plenary
powers to supervise and control banks, and prohibiting legal
proceedings against banks without the governor's written
approval.
It was held that the depositors were not thereby deprived of their property without due process of law, and the
statute was not to be stricken down on the ground that they
were prevented from collection of the stockholders' liability
guaranteed by the Constitution. They were not illegally
denied the right of a speedy remedy in the courts for the redress of a wrong.
The Act was considered to be a valid exercise of the
police power for the protection of the general welfare in view
of the existing emergency.
The measure did not "unreasonably" invalidate private
rights or "arbitrarily" violate the guarantees.
It was said the depositors and others affected must not
be allowed to so use their own property as to bring an irreparable calamity upon the general public.'
On the other hand, the Arkansas Act preventing a deficiency judgment in a foreclosure suit was held void. This
law provided that the value of the real estate involved in a
mortgage foreclosure suit shall be the amount of the mortgage loan irrespective of the amount which may be realized
from the sale of the property, and that plaintiff shall not be
entitled to decree of foreclosure unless he shall file a stipulation that he will bid the amount of the debt, interest, and
costs, and, before the court may confirm a sale, it must determine that the purchaser bid the fair market value of the property notwithstanding the absence of fraud or inequitable conduct.4
In Federal Land Bank of St. Louis v. Floyd, it was
held that this Act could not be given a retroactive effect. 5
'Cleveringa, State ex tel. v. Klein, 1 U. S. L. J. 353.
'Zimmerman, State ex rel. v. Gibbes, 1 U. S. L. J. 263.
'Adams v. Spillyards. 1 U. S. L. J. 386.
I U. S. L. J. 386.
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The Supreme Court of Washington decided on June
5th that it was within the power of the legislature to authorize an issuance of $10,000,000 of state bonds for unemployment relief although the constitutional debt limit was
$400,000, but this limitation did not apply to debts incurred
"to repel invasion and suppress insurrection."
It was thought that, in view of existing conditions, it
could be said that the purpose of the Act was to "suppress
insurrection," although no acts of violence had yet occurred.
It was proper to suppress the insurrection before it arose. 6
These cases are striking illustrations of the development
of the doctrine, which a recent writer has termed "amorphous."
It is to be noted that these state cases are in a different
classification from those dealing with national legislation.
The various states possess unlimited police power in respect of their domestic affairs, and the national government
does not possess the police power under any specific grant,
and can exercise such power only in relation to a power otherwise possessed.
The supreme courts of the several states may in general
determine for themselves the construction to be placed upon
their state constitutions (subject to the 14th Amendment).
One court may determine to uphold an Act under the
doctrine of transcendent police power and the next court on
the same or similar facts hold that the constitutional guarantees concerning due process and contract rights are applicable
at all times and under all circumstances, and that the "police
power" can be exercised only within limits and without
transcending the guarantees.
Under the latter view, certain fundamental liberties exist, which it is the object of the "bill of rights" to declare, and
the purpose having been declared without exception, no
exception can be implied.
Under the conditions of the present, it is difficult, if not
impossible, for a lawyer to forecast with any degree of certainty the result which will be arrived at by the state court in
adopting the one view or the other. The "judicial process"
is affected by the individual viewpoint of the judge-his entire personal background-the liveliness of his apprehension
'Hamilton, Wash., ex rel. v. Martin, 1 U. S. L. J. 369.
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or appreciation of the declared emergency, so a prognostication here is not attempted, nor anything further than a mere
indication of the philosophy of the "pro-emergency" people
as opposed to that of those who insist on a strict constitutionalism.
As to the application of the doctrine to state legislation,
we leave the subject here with the quotation from a decision
by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, which might have had
some bearing in the recent decision of that court upholding
the Mortgage Moratorium Act, to which reference has been
made:
"Constitutions are not made for existing conditions only, nor in
the view that the state of society will not advance or improve, but for
future emergencies and conditions, and their terms and provisions are
constantly expanded and enlarged by construction to meet the advancing and improving affairs of men."

Elwell v. Comstock, 99 Minn. 261, 109 N. W. 113.
The problem with respect to Federal government is different. Can the doctrine be applied to national legislation
and laws otherwise transcending the specific grants of power
be upheld because of the existence of an emergency nationwide in scope?
The Federal government is one of limited authoritythe state in respect of the exercise of the "police power" is
unlimited.
The National Industrial Recovery Act includes as a feature the power of the President to impose on an industry a
"Code of Fair Competition, fixing such maximum hours of
labor, minimum rates of pay, and other conditions of employment in the trade or industry or subdivision thereof investigated, which he finds to be necessary to effectuate the
policy of this title. * * *"

This Act is avowedly based on the commerce clause.
The "Recovery Act" goes farther than the recent proposal for an act limiting working time to 30 hours a week.
The latter contained no features concerning wage fixation.
Both measures proceed upon the postulate that Congress under its right of control of "interstate commerce" may
lawfully impose such requirements as a condition of the right
to engage in the business.
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The theory is that Congress possesses this power to regulate or prohibit interstate commerce merely on account of
the general public good-Congress possesses unlimited power
in the premises and that its motives are not to be inquired
into.
The theory seems to collide with the doctrine of the
"Child Labor" case (Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S.
251). In that case the court held an Act of Congress to be
unconstitutional which prohibited transportation in interstate commerce of goods made in a factory in which within
30 days prior to their removal therefrom children under the
age of 14 years had been employed or permitted to work.
It was held that this was not a regulation but rather an
attempt to control the hours of labor of children in the
states. It was said:
"Over interstate transportation or its incidents the regulatory
power of Congress is ample, but the production of articles intended for
interstate commerce is a matter of local regulation. * * *
"The grant of power to Congress over the subject of interstate
commerce was to enable it to regulate such commerce, and not to give it
authority to control the states in their exercise of the police power over
local trade and manufacture. * * *
"The power of the states to regulate their purely internal affairs
by such laws as seem wise to the local authority is inherent and has
never been surrendered to the general government. * * *
"To sustain this statute would not be in our judgment a recognition of the lawful exertion of congressional authority over interstate
commerce, but would sanction an invasion by the Federal power of the
control of a matter purely local in its character, and over which no
authority has been delegated to Congress in conferring the power to
regulate commerce among the states. * * *"

There was a vigorous dissent by Mr. Justice Holmes,
which was concurred in by McKenna, Brandeis and Clark.
Day wrote the majority opinion, White, Van Devanter and
McReynolds concurred. Of the justices participating only
Van Devanter and McReynolds, of the majority, are still on
the bench, and only Brandeis of the minority.
Six new justices who did not participate in that decision are Hughes, Sutherland, Butler, Stone, Roberts, and
Cardozo.
The dissent, of course, proceeds upon the doctrine that,
under the Constitution, sole control over interstate commerce
is vested in Congress, which possesses the broad right to de-
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clare the conditions under which commerce may be carried on.
The power is unlimited, and a movement of goods may be
regulated or prohibited without any regard whatever to their
character as being innocuous or harmful.
If this paramount power is found to come in collision
with the avowed policy of a state under its "general police
power," the latter must yield.
It is thought by some that, in view of the present personnel of the court, the result would be different and the
minority view would now be upheld if a case were presented
considered to be identical in principle with that of the Child
Labor case.
But quite apart from that speculation, it is the view of
many that legislation of the type of the "Recovery" Act can
be upheld on the "emergency" doctrine in line with the preamble or "declaration of policy" found in the Act.
An interesting discussion of this phase occurred in the
Senate on April 3rd, when the bill (S. 158)-30-hour week
-was under consideration.
Senator Black, the author of that bill, strongly upheld
the "emergency" doctrine.
Senator Borah asked this question:
"Mr. President, do I understand the Senator to admit
that if this were permanent legislation it would be unconstitutional?"
To which Black replied:
"I am simply calling attention now to this one phase
of it, that, even if anyone should reach the conclusion that
permanent legislation would not be authorized by the Constitution, that conclusion could not be urged with reference
to legislation for two years only without ignoring the opinions of the Supreme Court in the case of Block v. Hirsh;
Brown v. Feldman; Wilson v. New, and Fort Smith Railroad v. Mills."
(The Hirsh case is 256 U. S. 136, 41 Sup. Ct. 458, 16 A. L. R.
165; the Brown case, 41 Sup. Ct. 465; Wilson v. New, 243 U. S.
332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298, L. R. A. 1917E, 938; Fort Smith R. R. v.
Mills, 253 U. S.206, 40 Sup. Ct. 256.)

Mr. Borah remarked:
"The most objectionable feature of this bill is that
which rests upon the contention that the Congress or the
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court, or the Congress and the court, may adjudge a bill or a
law constitutional upon the theory that an emergency exists,
whereas, if no emergency exists it would not be regarded as
constitutional."
He then said:
"This measure presents one of the most important
questions, not only from a constitutional standpoint but
from a humanitarian standpoint, that has been presented of
late in this body. It presents the question of how far the
court will go in the future in permitting the Congress to exclude from interstate commerce any commodity which the
Congress in its wisdom may see fit to exclude. Secondly, it
involves the humanitarian and social question of limiting the
days of work per week. The former question presents a
constitutional problem which has been before the court from
time to time since the Government was organized and has
never yet been clearly and definitely and finally settled as to
the question presented by this measure. * * *
"Mr. President, let me say that if the emergency feature
is stricken from this bill, I myself shall not be averse to seeing
this proposed law go to the Supreme Court of the United
States, because I think it is an open question in the Supreme
Court of the United States as to the power which Congress
has to exclude from interstate commerce ordinary commodities."
Senator Black is here presented as arguing in support of
his bill solely because of the emergency, whereas, Senator
Borah repudiates that doctrine but states that he would be in
favor of the bill with the emergency feature stricken, because
he considers it to be an "open question" as to the power to
exclude "ordinary" commodities from interstate commerce.
That is, if it is considered that the "30-hour week" bill
is in the same category as the "Child Labor" Act involved in
Hammer v. Dagenhart, he, nevertheless, would be in favor of
presenting the matter anew to the Supreme Court of the
United States. However, the "emergency doctrine" is entirely abhorrent to him.
On the assumption that "N. I. R. A." is an Act in like
case with the Child Labor Act, it would appear that Mr.
Borah was right in the position he took.
The Federal Government is one of limited power, and a
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power not otherwise existing cannot be called into being
merely because of an assertion contained in a preamble.
The Block case referred to by Senator Black involved a
law of the State of New York and the police power possessed
by that state. The entire police power was possessed by the
state in respect of the subject-matter. In the then existing
emergency situation - housing shortage in connection with
the prosecution of the war-it was considered that ordinary
private rights had to yield to the transcendent police power
possessed by the state.
The Brown case, although dealing with a District of
Columbia matter, proceeded upon the theory that the District, in respect of questions of policing, had a power equivalent to that possessed by a state.
Wilson v. New determined that Congress could, in the
exercise of its power over commerce, fix a standard working
day for employees engaged in the operation of trains on interstate carriers, and make a temporary wage regulation in
connection therewith. The right of control there upheld was
determined in view of a situation in which complete interruption of interstate commerce was threatened.
It was held that the public right and the public power
to preserve it was not "under the control of the private right
to establish a standard by agreement" and it was further said:
"nor is it an answer to this view to suggest that the situation
was one of emergency and that emergency cannot be made the
the source of power." Ex Parte Milligan, 401 Wall 2.
"The proposition begs the question, since although an emergency may not call into life a power which has never lived,
nevertheless, emergency may afford a reason for the exertion
of a living power already enjoyed."
The things undertaken by the Act therein questioned
were admittedly within the scope of "regulation"-an extreme application, however.
Thus, Wilson v. New cannot reasonably be relied upon
as supporting the "emergency" doctrine as at present expounded.
Furthermore, it appears fallacious to assume that such
an act as "N. I. R. A." is in the category of the Child Labor
case.
It will be noted that in the decision in the latter case
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there are a number of references to the fact that the matter
treated of is one purely of "local concern"-that is, it was
considered to be clear that the purpose of Congress was not
to regulate commerce but to control the State of North Carolina in respect of its domestic policy.
If it may be discerned in connection with legislation fixing hours of labor or limitation on the export of oil from a
state which has been produced in violation of the law of that
state, etc., that a real national policy is involved, then, on the
basis of the determination of such national policy, Congress
possesses full power of control over the transportation of
such articles and by forbidding the same is not trenching
upon the authority possessed by the state.
The legislative declaration of "national policy" does
not bind the courts, and it is a judicial question whether the
"policy" exists in such sense as to warrant the contemplated
exertion of power.
Thus, if Congress should undertake to apply the
"quota" principle to the production of oil within the several
states, and to forbid the export of that oil from any state
exceeding the "quota" upon the asserted policy of conserving
oil for the use of the Navy, or for any other particular national purpose, the question would be open for the courts to
determine whether or not a matter which hitherto has been
regarded as purely a local problem of production has actually
become one of national concern.
In this view and in the light of present conditions, it
would seem to be a comparatively easy matter to show that
there is a sufficient basis in national policy for the exertion of
the broad control attempted by "N. I. R. A." in so far as it
deals with the prohibition or regulation of goods moving in
interstate commerce.
However, a reading of the Act will convince that its
purpose is to go farther than a regulation of products moving in interstate commerce.
Seemingly, a virtually unlimited control of production
is attempted by the Act.
The preamble in its reference to the "policy of Congress
to remove obstructions to the free flow of interstate and for-
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eign commerce which tend to diminish the amount thereof"
is stated to afford the basis for the broad policy of control
over management and production within the state.
The concept is that anything affecting intrastate commerce affects interstate commerce.
If, for example, a company engaged only in a local business should be considered not subject to the operation of the
"Recovery Act," whereas, its competitor engaged in business
in the several states should be subject to the Act, the result
would be that the latter would be subjected to a competition
it could not meet at the hands of the local company. The
latter would not be under regulation as to wages, hours of
employment, etc., and could underprice the products of its
competitor.
So, Congress endeavored to include all operations, and
it is evident that the Administrator considers that local operations are covered.
It is true that a number of the sections refer solely to
transactions in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.
(Sec.3-B, 3-F, 4-A.)
However, the provision that the President may, upon
certain findings, proceed to license business enterprises, in order to make effective a code of fair competition, does not contain a reference to the "interstate" feature. (Sec. 7, 7-C,
10-A.)
Some of these enforcement provisions are connected
with the interstate commerce feature--others are not. One
might surmise that in the one case the author of the bill saw
that he was on pretty firm ground and desired specifically to
mention the interstate feature-this, however, does not evidence an intent to make the Act applicable only in such case.
The framework of the Act may have been so set up as to save
it as severable if it should be held that the control over production could be applied only to an interstate operation.
Is it possible, under the emergency or the "national policy" theory, to extend the application of the Act to business
purely local in character and not in competition with interstate business, under the concept that all business is now affected with a public interest-a claim recently advanced by
Senator Wagner? His speech in the Senate seemed to limit
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this theory to control of the state business found to be in
competition with interstate commerce.
Is it true that emergency may produce a situation where
state and Federal subjects are so far "blended" that it can
legitimately be said the national policy of recovery would
fail unless all operations within a state be nationally controlled? In such a situation it is argued that the state authority yields to the Federal authority of necessity. This is deduced on the authority of the Minnesota rate cases.
Certainly such a conclusion would require a very great
extension of doctrines hitherto taught. Perhaps that "advance" is not greater than that already taken by some state
courts in upholding such legislation as acts declaring moratoria.
In the Kansas Natural Gas case, 221 U. S. 227, the
court said:
"* * * we have said that 'in matters of foreign and interstate
commerce there are no state lines.' In such commerce, instead of the
states, a new power appears and a new welfare, a welfare which transcends that of any state. But rather let us say it is constituted of, the
welfare of all the states and that of each state is made the greater by a
division of its resources, natural and created, with every other state.
That was the purpose * * * of the interstate commerce clause of the
Constitution of the United States."

There is no fixed line of demarcation between matters of
local or state concern on the one side and those of national
concern on the other. With the changes and developments of
society a matter commonly regarded as local in aspect may
become one of national importance.
Nevertheless, it would appear to be impossible for the
national power to arrogate to itself control of all subjects.
Mr. Justice Holmes remarked in the Superior Oil case,
280 U. S. 390:
"The importance of the Commerce Clause to the Union, of
course, is very great. But it also is important to prevent that clause
being used to deprive the states of their life blood. * * *"

So, the question is whether the "new welfare" or "new
deal," may be carried to the extent that, because of a critical
economic condition, control over all industry may be assumed
under the claim of a total integration and that state lines disappear and all business is now impressed with a national
interest so as to make every operation one in interstate commerce for the purpose of the Act.
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Professor Handler, in his fine article on N. I. R. A. in
the August "Bar Journal," says that: "The emergency created a mist in which the familiar contours of the landmarks
of constitutional decision seemed blurred or even lost."

I trust this contribution may not intensify the gloom.
It is intended merely to indicate the rationale by which acts
of the new dispensation may be upheld.
EMINENT RIVAL AUTHORS

JOHN

By J. W. KELLEY of the Denver Bar
MARSHALL,

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of

the United States, in his fiftieth year wrote a Life of
George Washington, the first president. It is a dull work
of five volumes, Marshall not-having a knack for biography,
yet evidently fancying himself gifted in that respect to the
point of vanity. The most entertaining portion of the Life
is in the Appendix where the author sets out with scrupulous
care the original draft of the Declaration of Independence, as
penned by Thomas Jefferson, and the changes and improvements afterward made at the suggestion of others.
Marshall was careful to state that John Adams, Benjamin Franklin and R. R. Livingston were on the drafting
committee with Jefferson. He proved beyond question that
the most brilliant paragraph in the Declaration was lifted
bodily from a resolution written by Richard Henry Lee and
that other paragraphs (especially the one on slavery), afterward stricken out, were clumsily written. Marshall had no
great opinion of the third president of the United States,
politically or otherwise, and he evidently sought by this
means to prove to posterity that the faultless phrases of the
immortal Declaration were not entirely emanations from the
brain of Jefferson, and his original draft an inferior grade of
literary skill. As evidence that the object of the great Chief
Justice was to diminish Jefferson's reputation as a writer it
is noted that when Marshall later prepared a one volume Life
of Washington he abridged everything in his original work
except the part of the Appendix reflecting upon Jefferson's
literary ability which he set forth in all the meticulous amplitude of his first effort.
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Of course, proof of the exact authorship of the Declaration had little place in the life of Washington but the
volumes came from the press at the time Jefferson was president and this slap at his literary fame was only one of a number of sly digs taken at him by the eminent jurist.
If Marshall had revealed to us in the biography the
foibles and vanities of Washington, in little things, as clearly
as he betrayed his own, in the appendix, he would have excelled Boswell.

HAWAIIAN JUSTICE 100 YEARS AGO
By FRANK L. GRANT of the Denver Bar
The following account of the method of administering justice in
the Hawaiian Islands one hundred years ago may interest some of the
readers of DICTA. It is an excerpt from a diary in the possession of
Mrs. Grant kept by her maternal grandfather, an English surgeon, who
visited the Islands in December, 1831.

"Behind the Queen's house were two or three magnificent large and widespreading trees (called by the natives
"Tow" trees). Their branches were covered with carnationcolored flowers and dark green foliage. Beneath the ample
shade of these trees, justice often swayed their sceptre. Here
all trials were conducted from those of a serious nature to that
of petty dispute or minor litigation. Having on several occasions been an eye-witness to a native trial the following remarks may tend in some measure to illustrate the mode of
proceedings as adopted by the parties concerned therein. If
the trial proved to be one of any particular importance due
notice would be given to the people overnight by certain
worthies in office termed constables. At sunset, moreover, it
was customary for one of these preservers of the peace to station himself on one of the stone wharves in his district and
with stentorian voice to bawl out a word or two of advice
and caution to the inhabitants of 'Fare,' such as to betake
themselves home, to keep a sharp lookout for thieves, with
diverse other admonitions. The constable in the next district
on hearing the well known sounds of his brother officer took
up the tale and in like manner passed the word to his neighbors. The necessary intelligence by these means was speedily
conveyed throughout the settlement from one extremity to
the other. During the quietude of the evening, we were often
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entertained with these loud vociferations of solos especially
when any visitors chanced to come over from the adjacent
island, the natives of Bollabolla having obtained the well
merited characters of being arrogant thieves.
"One evening we were apprized by these news-circulators that a native had lost his wife and his canoe carried off
by one of these unprincipled marauders-perhaps the latter
was the greater loss to the Huahinian. The constables who
are annually installed into office conducted the offender to be
tried to the station at dawn of day, for everything pertaining to business of this nature, if possible, is transacted at an
early hour in the morning, and the witnesses assembled to
give evidence either in behalf of or against the prisoner. The
native judge arrayed in his robe of state presided to pass judgment. This dress assumed by him for the occasion conveyed
neither a very solemn or commanding effect, but savored
strongly of the ludicrous. It consisted chiefly of a white mat,
which is usually made by the females of the island. In the
center of the mat was an oval shaped opening bound round
with some trimming and through which the black and closely
cropt cranium of the judge protruded, the dress covering the
shoulders, extending down before and behind as far as the
knees."If
the case to be investigated savored of importance
then the chief, the deacons of the church in their state dresses,
the constables of the different districts, usually attended with
a large concourse of natives of both sexes, who either in a
standing or squatting position formed a circle around the
principal performers of the piece. The witnesses assembled
then stood forward and stated the particulars of the case in
question against the prisoner, and were attentively heard.
Then the defenders in behalf of the prisoner were heard in
their turn and the culprit himself was afterwards allowed to
plead. Finally when the case was made out the judge referred
to his book he brought with him, containing the established
code of laws of the Island, and either acquitted or passed
sentence which the constable of the district had to see put into
effect. Punishments consisted either in transportation to another island, confiscation of property, hard labor, or fines in
money, hogs, or cloth according to the nature of the crime. I
believe from what I have witnessed these trials were conducted
with impartiality and justice to all parties."

PDictaphun
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THE NRA FOREVER
The Editor of The Colorado Graphic, with whom we exchange
back scratching, feels that we have removed the joie de vivre from life
by our reference (10 DICTA 303) to the toothache from which she
suffers. We fought the war in Hoboken and hence our French is limited.
It seems, however, in the Editor's case, that lack of joie de vivre results in ennui, boredom and being jaded. The same things result from
Republican administrations. Be a Democrat and have joie de vivre!
What we started out to say was that the new makeup of The
Graphic is a wow. Under the fourteen point heading "MOANING
AT THE BAR" is the slogan "We Do Our Part." Lots of lawyers
will sign that code.

WHO'S LOONEY NOW?
Floyd F. Miles, Esq., of the Denver bar, extracts humor from a
quotation of a part of a Colorado decision. Who are we to say that
Mr. Miles is wrong? In fact he is right, it is funny. Here 'tis:
"This action was brought by the defendant in error against plaintiff in error. The parties are hereafter referred to as plaintiff and defendant as they appeared in the trial court.

.

.

.

Defendant, while

insane, committed suicide."--London Co. v. Officer, 78 Colo. 441,
443.

STORY APROPOS OF THE NEW DEAL
Judge Hallett was in company with Caldwell Yeaman. The judge
had that day decided an important case against Mr. Yeaman's client.
Judge Hallett: You say this stuff has just come from Kentucky?
Why do you call it scire facias?
Yeaman: Because it will revive your judgment.
THIS IS A LONG STORY AND A GOOD STORY AND IT
FILLS UP SPACE!
The late Joel F. Vaile, father of the late Congressman William
N. Vaile, and one-time partner of the late Senators Wolcott and Waterman, was district attorney at Kokomo, Indiana, before he went west to
grow up with the country. He never forgot the searching cross-examination to which he subjected a witness on a prosecution for murder.
The murder had been committeed on the night of March 31, in the
late seventies. The evidence pointed almost indubitably to the young
man on trial, but was entirely circumstantial, and was weakened by
the defense of a strong alibi. It was claimed by the defense that on
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the night of the homicide the accused was at the home of his mother,
about sixty miles from the scene of the killing, and also as far distant
from a railroad. Two distinterested witnesses swore that they had
seen the accused at his mother's farm during the latter part of March,
but would not say positively that it was as late as the 31 st. The mother,
of course, testified that her son spent the night of the 31st on her farm,
and was turned over to the state for cross-examination.
District Attorney Vaile: How long did your son remain at your
place after March 3 1st?
Witness: About three days.
D. A.: How long was he there before the 31st?
W.: About three days.
D. A.: How long was he away from your place before that?
W.: I can't remember exactly-about a month.
D. A.: How long was he with you on that visit?
W.: I don't remember-a few days.
D. A.: Then he was not regular in his visits to the farm?
W.: Not very.
D. A.: How often this year has he been with you for a week's
time?
W.: Once in January; perhaps again in February.
D. A.: What time in January did he spend that week with you?
W.: I am sorry: I can't remember.
D. A.: What time in February was he with you? A week?
W.: I am not sure.
D. A.: But you are sure the 31st day of March was in the middle
of a visit?
W.: Yes.
D. A.: Can you tell me any other specific date when your son
was with you?
W.: He was with me Christmas a year ago.
D. A.: Can you remember any other date?
W.: I cannot.
D. A.: But you are sure about his being with you on March 3 1st?
W.: Sure.
D. A.: Is there any event or circumstance which makes that date
stand out clearly in your memory?
W.: Yes.
D. A.: What is it?
W.: There was a terrific storm that night in the country about
my place and many trees were blown down. We heard crash after
crash. One tree fell in the yard. Next morning my son arose before
I did, and called to me that Old Goose Neck had crashed to the ground.
Old Goose Neck was the large limb of a tree in the front yard, in
which the children played from childhood. It was named Old Goose
Neck because of its shape. I ran to the window, and my son called out:
"April Fool!"

MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION ACTS-PRO-

CEEDINGS-REVIEW BY COURT-Lockard v. Industrial Commis-

sion, et al.-No. 13302-Decided August 2, 1933--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Burke.
Plaintiff in error was plaintiff below. Plaintiff petitioned the
Industrial Commission to reopen as of its own motion his claim for
compensation, which case had been theretofore closed. The petition
was denied. Thereafter plaintiff filed a claim with the Commission for
subsequent disabilities, other than those mentioned in his original claim,
but which arose out of the same accident. The Commission entered its
award denying relief to the plaintiff. On appeal by the plaintiff to the
District Court the award was affirmed.
Plaintiff sued out writ of
error.
1. Plaintiff's claim for subsequent disabilities was no more than
another petition to the Commission to reopen the case as of its own
motion. Such a petition is discretionary with the Commission, and its
decision will be reversed only for fraud or a clear abuse of that discretion .- Affirmed.

WATERS-CHANGING POINT OF DIVERSION-SENIOR AND JUNIOR
APPROPRIATORS-RIGHTS OF-TERMS IMPOSED IN DECREE

CHANGING POINT OF DIVERSION-The Farmers Reservoir and
IrrigationCompany us. Town of Lafayette, et al.-No. 12896Decided August 2, 1933.---Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
The town of Lafayette brought this action to change the point of
diversion of certain of its water which it uses for domestic purposes.
The plaintiff company having an appropriation for irrigation from the
same stream, South Boulder Creek, and claiming that such change
would be detrimental to it, demurred, which demurrer was overruled,
the cause tried to the court, which permitted the change in point of
diversion under terms and conditions which did not injuriously affect
the vested rights of other appropriators.
The plaintiff company insists that its demurrer should have been
sustained because the application of the town of Lafayette shows a
contemplated enlarged use of a different character; that the decree shows
that the same was adjudged to its injury; that the Howard Ditch Co.
should have been made a party and its claim of the latter's abandonment of a portion of its decreed priority litigated.
1. The town of Lafayette had the burden of showing no injury.
2. Return waters should be taken into consideration in determining the right of lower senior appropriators to have their full decreed
priorities pass the headgate of upper junior appropriators.
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3. Abandonment, heretofore excluded as an issue in actions to
change the point of diversion, may be shown.
4. Junior appropriators cannot complain of changed conditions
which inflict no substantial injury upon them.
5. The right of petitions to such changes depends largely upon
the facts of each particular case and a decree granting a change, based
upon competent testimony, will not be disturbed.
6. It was alleged that the Howard company had abandoned a
portion of its original appropriation and it is contended that the company's motion to make it a party should have been granted but there is
no contention that the particular water whose point of diversion is
changed by this decree, has been abandoned.--Judgmentaffirmed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-WAIVER OF TIME LIMIT ON FILING
CLAIMS-CONCLUSIVENESS OF COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF FACT

-Industrial Commission of Colorado and Frank X. Meile vs.
Co-Operative Oil Company-No. 13276-Decided August 7,
1933.-Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
Claim for compensation by an injured employee under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Colorado. On the original hearing before
the referee the claim was denied on the ground that at the time of the
injury the company employed less than four persons and so was not
subject to the Act. On employee's petition for review the Commission
held a further hearing, determined that the company did employ as
many as four persons, and allowed compensation. The company sued
in the District Court to set aside the award, interposing there for the
first time the defense that notice of claim for compensation had not
been filed with the Commission within six months after the injury, as
required by the Act. The court overruled this defense but held that
the company did not employ as many as four employees and set aside
the award. Employee assigns error and the company assigns crosserror.
Held:
1. By its delay in pleading the bar of the statutory six-months
limitation, the company waived this defense.
2. The determination of the Commission that the company
employed as many as four employees was based on conflicting evidence,
and therefore cannot be disturbed by the courts. Judgment reversed,
with directions to reinstate the Commission's award.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-DEATH BENEFIT TO WIDOW NOT
RESIDING IN UNITED STATES-HUSBAND AND WIFE-DOMICILE-The Colorado Fuel and Iron Company vs. The Industrial

Commission-No. 13234-Decided August 7, 1933.--Opinion
by Mr. Justice Bouck.
1. Employee, who had been regularly receiving compensation
for injury which he had suffered in 1925, died in 1931 from cause not
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resulting from such injury. At time of his death there was still unpaid
$2,172.58 of compensation awarded him for permanent partial disability. His widow applied for payment to her of entire unpaid balance
and Industrial Commission awarded it to her. District Court affirmed
such award.
2. If court can say, under the evidence, that widow was residing
in Mexico when her husband died, she was entitled to only one-fourth
of unpaid and unaccrued portion of awarded compensation under C. L.
1921, Sec. 4440, as amended by Ch. 201, S. L. 1923, Sec. 11 '(C. L.
Suppl. 1932, Sec. 4440).
3. In absence of affirmative evidence to contrary, wife's domicile
is presumed to merge in that of husband: she is presumed to live with
her husband in his home. Underlying thought of dependency is duty
to support and under Workmen's Compensation Act wife is "conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent" unless it is shown that she is
voluntarily separated and living apart from husband at time of husband's injury or death and was not dependent.
4. Under facts shown and with no evidence to overcome the
usual presumptions, it sufficiently appears that widow resided in Mexico with her husband up to time of his death.
5.
The residence at time of injury is not the only residence to
be considered on question of non-residence in United States; C. L.
1921, Sec. 4431, as amended by S. L. 1923, Ch. 201, Sec. 9 (C. L.
Suppl. 1932, Sec. 4431) has to do with fact of dependency and not
with amount to be paid.-Judgment reversed.

FACTS REQUIRE REVERSAL -Randall
vs. MansfieldNo. 13300-Decided August 7, 1933.-Opinion by Mr. Justice
Bouck.
Mrs. Mansfield brought replevin against Carrie Randall and her
husband and she recovered first before a justice of the peace and then
in the County Court of Pueblo County, George B. Baker, judge.
The evidence disclosed that plaintiff bad a claim against Mrs. Randall's husband but none against Mrs. Randall. The property reached
belonged to Mrs. Randall and she was not liable. The judgment was
reversed on the facts. No principle of law was announced, as none
was involved.

REPLEVIN

PLEADINGS-COMPLAINT-SUFFICIENCY OF-People for the Use of

County Commissioners vs. Brown, et al.-No. 12762-Decided
August 7, 1933.--Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
1. Defendants were the County Treasurer of Montezuma County
and the sureties upon his bond. Defendant Brown, the Treasurer,
upon learning that certain properties were to be redeemed from tax
sales, without making this fact known to the Board of Commissioners,
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obtained from them authority to settle the tax claims at a figure less
than the full amount due. He then, in a dummy name, bought the
certificates for the smaller amount. When the properties were redeemed, he kept to his own use the difference between the amount he
had paid and the amount redeemed for. Defendant filed motion to
make more specific the facts upon which it was contended that the owners of the properties were about to redeem. The court sustained the
motion. The plaintiffs refused to amend as directed and elected to
stand on the complaint, whereupon judgment was given for the defendant, to which error is assigned.
2. The details contemplated in the court's ruling would be but
evidence of ultimate facts already appearing, to plead it would be subversive of recognized rules of pleading. Although the complaint could
have been more simply drawn, it does state a cause of action,
3. A County Treasurer is not permitted to be interested in tax
sales. He should be disinterested in the discharge of his official duties.
-Judgment reversed and remanded.

CONFLICT OF LAWS - NOTICE - American
Equitable Assurance Co. v. Hall Cadillac Co.-No. 12853Decided August 7, 1933.--Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
1. Where one unauthorizedly removes an automobile which was
covered by a conditional sales agreement from another state to Colorado, and here disposes of said automobile to an innocent purchaser,
the rights of such purchaser are paramount to those of the claimant
under the conditional sales agreement.
2. A conditional sale contract, even though valid outside of
Colorado, cannot be here asserted against one who, in good faith and
without notice of defect in title, purchases such property from one having open possession of articles sold-Judgment affirmed.
CONDITIONAl. 3ALES -

OF FACT-CONTRACT--John N. Stoddard and The Exploration Company vs. Philip Kuhn-No.
12812-Decided August 15, 1933.-Opinion by Chief Justice
Adams.
Defendant in error was allegedly employed to do certain acts in
and about the office of plaintiff in error for which claim is made of
quite substantial salary.
1. Where defense is based upon the contention that the salary
claimed is ridiculous and impossible considering services to be performed, this is exclusively a matter for the jury to decide, and the Supreme Court will not reverse such decision once it has been given.
-Judgment affrmed.
EMPLOYMENT-QUESTIONS
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REM-Lehrman
Mercantile Company v. C. M. Ireland-No. 13321-Decided
August 15, 1933.--Opinion by Chief Justice Adams.

MOOT QUESTIONS-ACTIONS IN PERSONAM AND IN

Plaintiff paid unto defendant the amount ordered in the judgment
previously rendered by the District Court, and subsequently prosecutes
a writ of error.
1. Court will not give its opinion on moot questions or abstract
propositions.
2. It is immaterial whether previous judgment was in rem or in
personam, for it is now moot.-Writ dismissed.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-DEFENSES

THERETO-

SET-OFF -

J.

M. Daugherty vs. The White Eagle Oil Corporation-No.13351
-Decided August 15, 1933.-Opinion by Chief Justice Adams.
Plaintiff in error purchased gasoline at a certain price, which price
was subsequently increased. However, the defendant continued to buy
the gasoline, and later gave his note for the amount owed, for which
note the plaintiff brought suit, and obtained judgment. Defendant
counterclaims for difference in the two purchase prices.
1. No fraud or mistake is alleged, and the defendant's voluntary
signature to note fixes the amount of his obligation.
2. "One who gives a note for the payment of a debt after the
same was contracted waives all defenses of which he had full knowledge at the time such settlement was made."--Judgment affirmed.

RESISTING OFFICER-JUDGMENTS AND DECREES OF COURTS-P. C.

Feste vs. People-No. 13319-Decided August 15, 1933.Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Adams.
1. Defendant Feste resisted and hindered a constable in the latter's attempt to execute a writ of restitution in unlawful detainer, issued
by a justice of the peace. Defendant was not a party to the unlawful
detainer proceedings. The writ showed on its face that plaintiff in the
forcible entry and detainer proceedings had obtained a judgment. Defendant was convicted of obstructing, opposing and resisting an officer
in the execution of his duties. He assigns error on several points of
evidence (on each of which the Supreme Court finds that he is not
sustained by the record) and on the ground that the unlawful detainer
proceedings were irregular for lack of proof of a written demand for
possession or payment of rent.
Held: Defendant not being a party to the unlawful detainer proceedings, and the writ of restitution appearing on its face to have been
issued from competent authority and with legal regularity, any lack of
proof in the unlawful detainer proceedings of a proper demand for
possession or rent does not concern the present defendant and does not
constitute any defense.-Judgment affirmed.
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HABEAS CORPUS-WRONGFUL CONVICTION-JUVENILE COURTJURISDICTION OF-DISTRICT COURT-JURISDICTION OF-Peti-

tion of Phillips for Writ of Habeas Corpus-No. 13283-Decided August 15, 1933.--Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Adams.
1. Petitioner was convicted in the Juvenile Court. Inasmuch as
he was an adult at the time of his conviction , the conviction was unlawful, the Juvenile Court having exceeded its jurisdiction. Pursuant
to the petition, the District Court ordered the prisoner brought before
it. The warden of the penitentiary acknowledged service of the writ
and moved to quash it on the ground that the District Court had no
jurisdiction. Petitioner assigned error.
2. It was settled in Abbott vs. People, 91 Colo. 510, that the
Juvenile Court exceeded its jurisdiction when it tried and convicted
adults.
3. The contention of the Attorney General that the District
Court could not by habeas corpus review the decision of courts over
which it has no appellate jurisdiction is unsound. The Juvenile Court
had no jurisdiction at all.--Judgment reversed.

CRIMINAL LAW---SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE-Reger v.

The People

-No. 13366-Decided August 24, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
Fred Reger was found guilty of statutory rape of a girl 15 years
old and was sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary for not less
than three years nor more than four and one-half years. The only
assignment of error argued on application for supersedeas is the insufficiency of the evidence.
1. From the evidence it appears beyond any reasonable doubt
that Reger, a married man, and the father of three children, had sexual
intercourse repeatedly with a girl only 15 years old. On the main
facts, her testimony was unshaken on cross-examination, and her testimony was corroborated by disinterested witnesses. Reger himself did
not take the witness stand. The evidence was sufficient to sustain the
conviction.--Judgment affirmed.

SHERIFF-DEPUTY-LIABILITY OF SURETY ON SHERIFF'S BOND FOR

ACTS OF DEPUTY-Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland
v. Hershey-No. 12930-Decided September 5, 1933--Opinion
by Mr. Justice Bouch.
The Surety Company was on the official bond of Hershey, Sheriff
of the City aand County of Denver. A person charged with commission of a crime in Oklahoma was, at the request of the Oklahoma authorities, and pursuant to application of Oklahoma authorities, for his
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arrest, and in accordance with appointment by the Governor of Colorado issued to Hershey's deputy, by the deputy arrested, and delivered
in Oklahoma.
Suit was brought in Oklahoma against the Surety and the Denver Sheriff and his deputy, but no service was had upon the Denver
Sheriff or his deputy. This action was brought by the Surety Company against the Denver Sheriff for expenses incurred in defending such
action.
1. The deputy sheriff was not acting in his official capacity as
deputy sheriff in making the arrest, but by virtue of his appointment
as agent made the arrest at the request of the Governor.
2. The Surety on the Sheriff's official bond could not be subjected to liability even though Sheriff was guilty of false arrest or false
imprisonment, even if the extrastate act was unauthorized.
3. The Surety on the bond cannot hold Hershey, the Sheriff,
liable for its expenses in defending suit.
4.
Neither the official bond of the Sheriff nor the indemnity
agreement is broad enough or clear enough to cover any of the above
acts.
5. The deputy sheriff acted altogether independently of his office
as deputy sheriff and beyond the territorial limits of his official status.
-- Judgment affrimed.

v. The Industrial
Commission of Colorado, et al.-No. 13249-Decided September
5, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-MANDAMUS--Roper

This is a mandamus proceeding brought in the District Court
of Pueblo County against the insurer of an employer under the workmen's compensation act. The petitioner sought to compel payment of
an amount which he alleged to be due under a certain rule of procedure
adopted by the Industrial Commission in 1928, but now superceded.
The Court below declined to issue a writ and the petitioner asked for
a reversal.
1. Where questions of fact exist, which have not been determined by the Industrial Commission, the Commission itself is the only
body thae can determine such questions.
2. A writ of mandamus is not the proper method of reviewing
the acts of the Industrial Commission.
3. The Industrial Commission Act contains the exclusive remedies by which the acts of the Commission can be reviewed.
4. Mandamus may not be invoked for the purpose of testing
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the meaning or validity of a rule of procedure framed by the Industrial Commission.
5. Since the petition. herein shows there is neither a clear legal
right in the petitioner nor a clear legal duty corresponding thereto, the
mandamus writ was properly denied.--udgment affirmed.

SECRET SORROWS
(By Omar E. Garwood)
"We think every man knows that the steel engraving or lithograph
and gold seal on a bond or stock certificate laid away in a tin box
may be eloquent only of a secret sorrow. It does not follow, however,
that equity affords a balm in every instance."
Buchhalter v. Meyers, 85 Colo. 419, 439.

LEGAL ADVERTISING
The Bar Bulletin issued by the Bar Association of the city of
Boston for September contains an interesting article headed "The
Lawyer's Dilemma," in which the suggestion is made that a too rigid
enforcement of the rule forbidding lawyers t0"solicit business, contained
in the canons of ethics of all bar associations and enforced by the
courts, might defeat to a certain extent the object for which it was
enacted. The editor states that:
"In rural communities, in towns, and in small cities-the names,
the professional ability, and the personal characteristics of the lawyers
in those localities are widely known, or, if a prospective litigant is
ignorant in the matter, be has no difficulty in securing accurate information. The result is that a person living in such a community who needs
the services of a lawyer is able to make a selection based upon real data.
"As the community increases in population, the layman's opportunity to make an intelligent selection of counsel grows progressively
less, until, in a city as large as Boston, it virtually vanishes. This is
not to be taken as implying that men and women of large affairs must
act blindly. Their connections in the business and social worlds and
their desirability as clients enable them to weigh the qualifications of
numerous lawyers. Outstanding success brings clients to the fortunate
few whose names are widely known. The average lawyer, however, is

DICTA
largely dependent for his practice upon the very limited circle of his
friends. He has no particular reputation. There is nothing to indicate
the desirability of his selection from among the three or four thousand
lawyers practicing in Boston.
"Under these circumstances, the task of the average layman in a
large city in selecting his lawyer is almost hopeless. His affairs are of
too little importance to make him a welcome client in the very large
offices, even if he had the courage to take himself in that direction. If
he has no lawyer among his acquaintances, he may seek the advice of
friends, or avail himself of some other agency. The rule that a client
must seek the lawyer and not the lawyer the client, however excellent
in theory, fails to work in a large city. The bar is conscious not only
that soliciting, direct as well as indirect, is a frequent occurrence, but
also that the business-seeking lawyer gets results. Too often, the lawyer
who observes strictly the rules of the profession sees the bulk of the
law business going to others whose ideals are not as high. It is no
wonder that under such circumstances the bar is anxiously taking stock
of the situation."
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will restore:

TO YOUTH-Temperance--a lost virtue under Prohibition.
TO THE GOVERNMENT-Large revenues now enjoyed by
bootleggers, gangsters and organized crime.

A TO THE CITIZEN-Reduced taxation.
A TO LABOR-Increased employment by legitimizing an honA
A
A

orable industry.
TO COMMERCE-Increased circulation of money due to the
increased employment and a popular commodity.
TO THE PUBLIC-Control through police licenses and abolition of the lawless speakeasy, the spawn of Prohibition.
TO PUBLIC HEALTH-Decent wines and beverages in place
of the prevailing vicious poisons.

VOTE REPEAL SEPT. 12. Put Colorado over the top and on the
Honor Roll with her sister states. Don't let Colorado be a slacker. Go
to the polls Tuesday! USE YOUR VOTE!

Bonds Furnished in All
Court Proceedings . . .

THOS. F. DALY AGENCY CO.
Sixteenth and Sherman
Phone KEystone 2211 for Immediate Service
All Forms of Insurance Written

May We Entertain Denver
Lawyers During the Coming
Season

Fox Mayan
Theatre

Compliments

of

Homer F. Bedford

H. B. ASHTON
I10 Broadway

For Better Performance of Your Motor Put in a Set of

Gyro Cartridge-Fire Spark Plugs
Manufactured in Denver

AMERICAN GYRO COMPANY
DENVER, COLORADO

A. H.Whaite & Co.
COMPRESSED AIR CARPET
CLEANERS
We Make a Specialty of Cleaning,
Washing and Repairing Fine
Oriental Rugs.

2519 W. Ilth Ave.

TA. 3279

Willard J. Guy
Company
408 Denver National Building
TAbor 2348
Multigraphing - Mimeographing
Mailing Lists
Right-Now Service

Precedent vs. Progress
A

GOOD SENSE OF JUDGMENT as to the relative

values of precedent and progress contributes much to
the success of an afforney-at-law.
Legal precedents are constantly cited as a sound
basis for judicial decision in the case at hand.
Recognition must be quick, however, of the fact that
the busy day of a successful professional or business man
allows no time for such antiquated precedents as the
bicycle rather than the automobile, the messenger rather
than the telephone, the kerosene lamp rather than the
electric light, and substitute fuels rather than GAS for
heating.
The choice of GAS HEAT marks one as properly
considerate of the time, health and comfort of the entire
family, and the freedom from work, worry and attention
is of the greatest vaTue socially as well as professionally.

Decide now to
HEAT WITH GAS
this winter

Public Service Company of Colorado

TRUST BANKING
for
Corporations and Individuals
Services to Corporations
Trustee under Corporate Mortgages
Depository for Protective Committees .
Transfer Agent and Registrar for Corporate
Stock

.

.

Miscellaneous Fiscal Agencies.
I

I

I

Services to Individuals and Families
Executor and Administrator of Estates . . .
Trustee under Wills . . . Trustee of Living
Trusts and Life Insurance Trusts . . . Safe-

keeping of Securities.
f

f

•

Escrows

BUSINESS SERVICE FOR BUSINESS MEN
AND WOMEN AND THEIR COUNSEL.

THE DENVER NATIONAL BANK
THE COLORADO NATIONAL BANK
THE INTERNATIONAL TRUST COMPANY
THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL BANK
THE AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK
I
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THE FINEST IN THE WEST

BEAUTIFUL

FAIRMOUNT

The Perpetually Cared for Cemetery
Established and dedicated in 1890-Area 560 Acres-Over 15,000 family lot owners, among
whom are numbered Colorado's foremost citizens-This silent 'city now has nearly
48,000 sleeping beneath its hallowed shade-A Perpetual Care Fund which safeguards
and' assures present and future care now amounts to over

One-third Million Dollars
An invitation is cordially extended to visit the new

FAIRMOUNT

MAUSOLEUM

THIS MASTERPIECE OF CLASSIC BEAUTY IS A CREDIT TO ANY COMMUNITY
For Further Information, write or telephone
WILFORD T. SHAY, Secretary
515 SECURITY BUILDING, DENVER

Phone TAbor 4087

PHONE MAIN 0275

LouisG.Carpenter

Furniture Repairing of Ali Kinds

Consulting Engineer

HENRY MEYER
Upholsterer & Furniture Manufacturer
538 East 17th Avenue at Pearl Street
Denver, Colorado

Legal Investigations-Examinations
Court Work-Reports

1455 Gilpin

STRICT ECONOMY
During 1932 61% of the adult services were
condudted from the Rogers Mortuary at an
average cost to the public of less than $265.00.

THE ROGERS MORTUARY
1544 LINCOLN STREET

YOrk 4676

The New Master Tire & Battery Service
777 Broadway

TAbor 2209

FEATURING Kelly-Springfield Tires, National Batteries, Cities Service Gasoline and
Motor Oils. Penn Fargo Motor Oil. PowerLube Motor Oil, Pennzoil Motor Oil and
Specialized Lubrication-Certified Brake Service--Accessories.
PHONE TABOR 2209 for Immediate Service--We Call for and Deliver Your Car

JOHN TAGGART

ART MALNATI

A METHOD TO IMPROVE

IN THE HEART OF THINGS

HEARING

SYMES
BUILDING

AURATONE

FIREPROOF

A Step Ahead In:

A method of accurately
analyzing and improving
your hearing

Elevators . .
Service . . .
Law Library

Recommended by many attorneys
who are taking this treatment at the
present time

619 DENHAM BUILDING
Sixteenth Street at Champa

MAIN 6016

GOLD

SEALS

LABEL

STOCK CERTIFICATES
RUBBER STAMPS

SACHS
1543 LARIMER
MAin 2266

-MINUTE

BOOKS

-LAWLOR
1622 STOUT
MAin 6300

